This paper uses a unique historical episode to assess the long-run effects of management practices on firm performance. During the 1950s, as part of the Marshall Plan, the US administration sponsored management-training trips for European managers to visit US firms and granted loans to European businesses to buy technologically-advanced machines from the US. I use newly-assembled panel data on the population of Italian firms eligible to participate in this program, tracked over a twenty-year period. The effects of the program are estimated by exploiting an unexpected cut in the US budget: I compare firms that eventually participated in the program with firms that were initially eligible to participate, but were excluded after the budget cut. I find that Italian firms that sent their managers to the US were more likely to survive, and had higher sales, employment, and productivity. These positive effects persisted for at least fifteen years after the program.
Introduction
One possible explanation for the large and persistent differences in productivity between firms is that they might reflect variations in management practices. However, establishing a causal relationship is challenging since more productive firms may simply adopt better management practices. Studies evaluating the causal effect of management on firm performance rely on randomized control trials (RCTs, Bloom et al. (2013) ; Bruhn et al. (2017) ) which employ a relatively small sample size, and cannot assess heterogenous and general equilibrium effects. Moreover, since RCTs have been implemented fairly recently, the long-run impact of management practices is not known.
In this paper I examine the long-run effects of management on firm performance, using evidence from a unique historical episode, the US Productivity Program. During the 1950s, as part of the Marshall Plan, the US sponsored training trips for European managers to learn modern management practices at US firms. In addition, the program also granted European businesses subsidized loans to purchase technologically-advanced US machines. 1 In Italy, small and medium-sized manufacturing firms from five geographic regions could apply for this program and decided whether to send their managers to the US (hereafter, management transfer), purchase US machines (technology transfer), or both (combined management and technology transfers). However, in 1952, when the program was about to start, the US unexpectedly cut the budget and only firms from five smaller Italian provinces -one for each of the original regions -eventually participated in the program ( Figure 1 ). As a result, some firms got the transfer they applied for and some did not, based on their geographic location.
I use newly-assembled panel data, collected from numerous historical archives, on the population of 6,065 Italian firms eligible to apply for the Productivity Program. For each firm, I collected and digitized balance sheets from 5 years before to 15 years after the Productivity Program and linked them to firms application records.
My identification strategy relies on the budget cut that took place in 1952, after all applications had been submitted and reviewed. I compare the performance of firms that applied for and eventually received either the management or the technology transfer with that of firms applying for the same transfer, but not receiving it due to the budget cut. I show evidence that before the budget cut participating and excluded firms were very similar in their observable characteristics, including pre-program performance trend.
I find three key results. First, I show that firms which sent their managers to the 1 US were more likely to survive, and had higher sales, employment, and productivity compared to companies that applied but did not get the management transfer due to the budget cut. These effects were large and persisted for at least 15 years after the program. For instance, productivity of the participating firms went up by 16.5 percent within one year, relative to the management comparison group, and continued to grow, reaching a cumulative increase of 52.3 percent after 15 years. Second, firms which received the technology transfer increased their performance, but the effect did not persist over time. Productivity gradually rose by a cumulative 19.5 percent in 10 years -relative to the technology comparison group -but there was no additional increase after that.
Third, I find that the effects of the Productivity Program on firms that received both the management and the technology transfers were significantly larger than the sum of the impact on firms that received only one transfer, suggesting a complementarity between management and technology. Productivity of firms that received both the management and the technology transfers increased by an additional 14.6 percent.
What changed in the firms that participated in the US managerial training? More than 90 percent of them adopted the new American managerial practices within three years since the Productivity Program and were still implementing them 15 years later.
Specifically, these companies started performing regular maintenance of machines and tracking of sales and orders. They also improved working and safety conditions, organized training classes for managers and other workers, and invested in market research, branding, and advertising. In the longer run, improved firm performance led firms to increase the number of plants and the manager-to-worker ratio, and to be more likely to become professionally-managed businesses (instead of being family-managed). Improved firm performance also gave firms greater access to bank credit, which, in turn, allowed them to invest more in physical capital. Finally, I find no evidence that the long-run effects of managerial training are explained by variations in firm exports and market power caused by the program.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, the idea that management is correlated with the productivity of inputs dates back to Walker (1887). More recent studies have shown a positive association between management practices, or managers, and firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar (2003) ; Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) ). RCTs have provided causal evidence that management consulting leads to better firm outcomes (Bloom et al. (2013) ; Bruhn et al. (2017) ). This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first study that uses non-experimental data to examine the long-term causal impact of management. Moreover, this research contributes to the literature by examining the complementarity between managerial practices and physical capital.
Second, this paper sheds new light on the role of technology in explaining productivity 2 differences. For instance, Doms et al. (1997) and Haltiwanger et al. (1999) document significant technology differences across plants within narrow sectors. The import of capital goods that embody new technology represents one channel through which technology diffuses (Coe and Helpman (1995) ; Coe et al. (1997) ). My research shows that the causal impact of technologically-advanced capital goods on firm performance does not persist over time, when it is not accompanied by proper managerial training.
Finally, this paper contributes to the debate about the role of the Marshall Plan on European recovery after WWII. A large body of research in past decades has focused on the macroeconomic effects of the plan (Mayne (1970) ; Milward (1984) ; De Long and Eichengreen (1991) ; Eichengreen et al. (1992) ), without reaching a consensus about the relevance of its impact on European economies. My work is the first to use firm-level data on a large scale to investigate one of the Marshall Plan.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Marshall Plan and the Productivity Program in Italy. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical framework and discusses the identification strategy. Section 5 examines the effects of the Productivity Program on firm performance. Section 6 analyzes the channels through which the Productivity Program affected firm performance. Section 7 studies the effects of the Productivity Program on firms that did not participate in it. Section 8 presents robustness checks. Section 9 concludes.
The Marshall Plan and the Productivity Program
The Marshall Plan, officially known as the European Recovery Program (E.R.P.), was an economic and financial aid program, sponsored by the US, which focused on helping 17
Western and Southern European countries recover from World War II (Boel (2003) ). It was in operation from 1948 to end of the 1950s. Between 1948 and 1951, it transferred approximately $130 billion (in 2010 USD) to Europe (Eichengreen et al. (1992) ), with the goals of rebuilding war-devastated regions, removing trade barriers, and preventing the spread of communism (Hogan (1987) ).
During the first months of the Marshall Plan implementation, the US realized that European firms were characterized by lower labor productivity than US plants (ECA (1949) ) and argued that this difference was largely due to the lack of a "managerial mentality" (Segreto (2002) In 1949, after visiting several factories all over Europe, James Silberman, the BLS Chief of Productivity and Technology Development, claimed that inefficiencies in management were a more severe problem than war damages (Silberman et al. (1996) ). Similarly, Ewan Clague, the BLS Commissioner, stated that the "productivity levels in the United States were more than twice those in Great Britain, and more than three times that of Belgium, France and other industrial countries of Europe" (Boel (2003) ).
In order to improve the productivity of European firms, starting in 1950, the US government introduced the United States Technical Assistance and Productivity Program (hereafter, Productivity Program). Between 1952 and 1958, the US organized study trips for European managers at US plants, followed by consulting sessions of US experts in European firms. Managers were taught the modern management practices, largely based on the training within industry (TWI) method. These practices covered: (1) factory operations; (2) production planning; (3) human resources training and management; and (4) marketing (ICA (1958) ). Factory operations consisted of regular machinery maintenance and general maintenance of safety conditions within the firm; production planning consisted of sales and order control. Human resources management and training required employee training within the firm and supervision on a regular basis. These combined practices allowed faster problem solving and a constant improvement of production methods. Finally, marketing training emphasized market research, product requirements, branding, and design. It also included advertising campaigns, and modernization of the distribution channels. Compared with the management practices implemented today, the main difference was the lack of content on quality management and lean production, developed by Toyota car factory in the early 1970s. However, today quality control is not included in many training programs headed to small and medium-sized firms ), at which the Productivity Program was aimed.
Although the main focus of the Productivity Program was management training, the US also introduced a Loan Program to help firms renew their stock of capital. The loans granted by the US administration were restricted to the purchase of technologically- The same operation took 3 minutes for 50 bottles with European machines, and did not provide sterilization (Dunning (1998) ). Similarly, in steel manufacturing, in the US the roof temperature of an open-hearth furnace was controlled by an electronic potentiometer that increased the roof life by four to five times (Dunning (1998) ). The interest rate on these loans was 5.5 percent, compared with a national average interest rate on loans of 9 percent between 1952 and 1958 (Zamagni (1997 ), and the repayment horizon was 10 years (ICA (1958)).
The Implementation of the Productivity Program in Italy
The US authorities originally intended to roll out the Productivity Program in Italy in two phases: a pilot program, and a nation-wide implementation. Even after the budget cut, the goal of the pilot phase remained to test whether the program was effective before the nation-wide implementation. Therefore, the US experts argued they selected provinces that were representative of each pilot region (CNP (1960)).
These provinces "[had] the average economic characteristics of the pilot region where they were located. They were not the most or the least developed areas" (CNP (1960), p.108).
For instance, in the pilot region of Veneto, the province of Vicenza was selected because "its structure reproduces Veneto's structure very well" (Bianchi (1993) CNP (1960) ). However, its budget was never increased and, therefore, the nation-wide implementation never happened.
Description of the Productivity Program in Italy
Firms received the US transfers between 1952 and 1958, based on the order in which they submitted their applications. 9
Regarding the management transfer, the study trips for managers consisted of a stay in the US for a period between 8 and 12 weeks. Managers were grouped in teams of about 15-20 people coming from firms operating in the same industry across Europe.
Almost all tours were preceded by an orientation period, lasting about one week, during which the team members could get to know each other. After that, the team members visited five or six US firms: these firms were chosen to have product lines similar to those that could be sold in Europe, and a scale of operation and managerial level to which Western European plants could aspire in 10 years (Silberman et al. (1996) ). A typical week consisted of three working days of plant visits. Managers worked side by side with 6 The reasons why not all the firms applied are investigated in Section 7.1. 7 16 applications were disregarded because they were incomplete, 11 because they asked loans for machines available for sale in Europe, and 3 because their amount of debt was considered too high. These 30 firms are excluded from my analysis in the rest of the paper. 8 Although the province of Monza was a very well defined geographical area, with 50 municipalities, it was officially recognized as a province in 2004 (Legge n.146, 06/11/2004) and started operating in 2009 (with the name of Monza and Brianza). 9 The order in which firms submitted their application determined the year in which managers participated in study trips and firms received the new machines (ICA (1958) ), based on the availability of US hosting firms and the number of trainees from other European countries (ICA (1958) In the US, we learned to manage firms the way they did and we were able to bring back those practices to our firms". 10 During the other three week-days, managers received formal training, and participated in meetings and seminars. Silberman noted that "demanding work requirements prevented boondoggling" (Silberman et al. (1996), p.447) . At the end of the study trips, the trainees had to leave the US and return to their origin firms. 11
Regarding the technology transfer, upon receiving the new machines, firms were granted a loan corresponding to the market value of the machines, for a maximum period of 10 years at an interest rate of 5.5 percent (ICA (1958) ). In addition to the transfer of physical capital, the US also organized study trips for Italian engineers and technicians in the US in order to transfer the know-how needed to use these new machines. These trips lasted between 4 and 7 weeks, during which Italian workers spent three days in US plants where they could see the machines in operation. On the other week-days, they attended seminars and wrote technical reports (ICA (1958) ).
All firms that participated in the Productivity Program were subject to a three-year monitoring period from US experts, who periodically visited them, provided consultation services in carrying out the program, and observed whether the new management practices and/or the new machines were in use (ICA (1958) Firm characteristics differ based on their geographical location. Northern pilot regions had larger firms than Southern ones, with higher assets, sales and productivity (Appendix (Lombardo (2000) ).
it was located, the application date, the number of people to be sent on a study trip for firms that applied for the management transfer, and the type of machinery requested, the loan amount and the number of engineers/technicians to be sent to the US from firms that applied for the technology transfer. This information is available for all the firms that applied, regardless of whether they eventually received US assistance or not. For firms in experimental provinces, which eventually participated in the program, the folders also contain the date and the length of the study trips, the US firms in which the training took place, the technical reports compiled by the US experts that visited these firms for three years after the study trips for firms that got the management transfer, and the date in which the new machine was received, its commercial value that corresponds to the value of the loan granted to the firm, whether and when the loan was repaid, as well as the US technical reports for three years after receiving the support for firms that got the technology transfer.
Using firm name and address, I uniquely match all the applications with firm balance sheets. In total, out of the 6,065 eligible firms, 3,624 applied for the Productivity Program Between 1952 and 1958, 1,275 Italian male managers, on average 35 years old, participated in the study trips; 88 percent of them were still working in the same firm 15 years after US intervention. This evidence is consistent with the very low labor turnover across
Italian firms (Saibante (1960) ). Ninety-eight percent of loans granted were repaid within the ten-year horizon imposed by the US. 17
Identification Strategy
The identification strategy of this paper relies on the unexpected cut in the US budget that reduced the scope of the Productivity Program from the regional to the smaller provincial level (Figure 1 , Panels A and B). This budget cut occurred in 1952, after all eligible firms applied for the program and all the applications were reviewed (and only 30 out of 3,594 were rejected). Therefore, in each region initially selected (pilot region) and for each US transfer firms applied for, some companies received it because they were located in selected provinces (experimental provinces); and some did not because they were located in provinces not selected (nonexperimental provinces).
I estimate the causal effects of the Productivity Program by comparing the pre-and post-Productivity Program outcomes of firms located in experimental provinces with those of firms located in nonexperimental provinces in the same pilot region and that applied for the same US transfer in 1951. The remainder of this section provides evidence in support of the research strategy and discusses the identifying assumptions.
Were Experimental and Nonexperimental Provinces in Each
Pilot Region Comparable? A possible concern about the use of post-WWII data is that, although experimental provinces were comparable to other provinces in each pilot region in 1951, they might have been different before WWII. In this case, differential firm outcomes in the post-war period might reflect not only the effect of the Productivity Program, but also provinces return to their pre-war level. Therefore, I examine the same economic indicators before WWII, using data from the 1937 Industrial Census. These data indicate that experimental and nonexperimental provinces looked comparable even before WWII (Appendix Figure A. 1, Panel I-M).
Were Firms in Experimental and in Nonexperimental Provinces
Observationally Equivalent?
I test directly whether firms in experimental and nonexperimental provinces that applied for the same US transfer were statistically indistinguishable in terms of their observed characteristics and outcomes in 1951, the year before the experimental provinces were selected. I estimate a cross-sectional regression, separately for each US transfer, in which I regress firm characteristics and outcomes in 1951 on an indicator for firms located in experimental provinces and a full set of pilot regions fixed effects. None of the 27 estimated coefficients on the experimental provinces indicator is statistically significant (Table 2, columns 3, 6, 9). I conclude these groups of firms were statistically indistinguishable before the Productivity Program. Table A .2). These results are consistent with the Italian recovery from WWII (Lombardo (2000)). However, the estimated coefficients on the interaction term are very close to zero and not significant (Appendix Table A .2). Moreover, the estimated coefficient on the experimental provinces indicator is not statistically different from zero in all the specifications, confirming the balancing tests' results presented in Table 2 .
Were Firms in
Second, I estimate a model in which I replace the linear time trend variable with a full series of year dummies and interactions of each year dummy with an indicator for firms in experimental provinces. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms, small in magnitude, are never significantly different from zero (Appendix Table A .2). Moreover, some are positive and others are negative, confirming the lack of any consistent pattern.
Finally, the F -statistics, reported at the bottom of each panel, show that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the interaction terms are jointly equal to zero (Appendix Table   A .2). These results suggest that firms that applied for any US transfer in experimental and nonexperimental provinces were on a similar time trend in the six years before the Productivity Program. 18
The Effects of the Productivity Program
In this section, I examine the effects of the Productivity Program on firm performance.
I document that firms that received the US transfers were more likely to survive, were larger (in terms of both sales and number of employees), and had higher productivity, measured by total factor productivity revenue (TFPR). The effects of the management transfer were large and persisted for the 15 years I follow firms after the program, while the effects of technology transfer did not persist over time. Finally, the impact of the Productivity Program for firms that received the combined management and technology transfers was larger than the sum of the other two transfers, suggesting complementarity between management and technology.
Extensive Margin: Firm Survivorship
Firms that participated in the program were more likely to survive than firms that applied The survival probability of firms in experimental provinces is higher than that of firms in nonexperimental provinces and the difference increases over time. In the three years after the program -which corresponds to the monitoring period in which US experts visited participating firms in Italy -no firms in experimental provinces exited the market, and the estimated survival probability of firms in nonexperimental provinces is over 96 percent.
Survival rates diverge over time, and after 15 years the estimated survival probability for firms in experimental provinces is between 88.5 and 93.9 percent, while it is between 67.6 and 69.1 percent for firms in nonexperimental provinces. 20 This difference is mostly driven by the low shut-down probability of firms in experimental provinces, while the survival rate of firms in nonexperimental provinces is comparable to that of firms that were eligible to participate to the program, but did not apply (65 percent after 15 years, 
where the dependent variable, outcome isprt , is one of the key performance metrics of logged (deflated) sales, number of employees, and TFPR of firm i operating in industry s, located in province p in region r at time t. Although for robustness, TFPR is estimated in a number of ways, the core method uses a version of the Ackerberg et al. (2006) 20 In all the samples, the log-rank test, stratified by pilot region, rejects the null hypothesis of equality between the empirical survivor functions of the two groups. The estimation of the corresponding Cox survival model is reported in Appendix Table A.7. 21 A survival rate of 65 percent after 15 years is higher than the average survival rate of Italian manufacturing firms in 1951 (50 percent after 5 years, ISTAT (1986) ). The reason is that firms eligible to participate in the Productivity Program were larger (47.7 employees on average) than other manufacturing firms (5.7 employees on average, according to the 1951 Census).
method. 22
↵ is a constant term; ExpProv p is an indicator that equals one if firm i is located in an experimental province; PostPP t+⌧ is an indicator for each year t, after firm i received the Productivity Program assistance, from 5 years before to 15 years after the program. Pilot region fixed effects r control for variation in outcomes across regions that are constant over time; industry fixed effects ⇣ s control for variation in outcomes across manufacturing industries; time fixed effects ⌫ t control for variation in outcomes over time that is common across all Italian regions. ✏ isprt is the error term. Standard errors are estimated by aggregating the data into two periods: pre-and post-intervention (as in Bertrand et al. (2004) ). Each t+⌧ coefficient captures the effects of the Productivity Program ⌧ years after its implementation.
Sales of companies in experimental provinces that applied for management and the combined management and technology transfers increased by 7.3 and 9.6 percent respectively one year after the US intervention, compared to firms in nonexperimental provinces that applied for the same transfer (Table 3 , Panel A, column 1). 23 These differences continued to increase significantly over time and, after 15 years, amounted to 42.5 and 60.0 percent, respectively (Table 3 , Panel A, column 1). Sales of firms that applied for technology transfer also rose, but the effects took time to materialize and did not persist over time.
The cumulative gain after 15 years is 10.4 percent, but the impact is no longer significantly increasing after 10 years (Table 3 , Panel B, column 1). To control for firm specific characteristics constant over time, I also report a specification with firm fixed effects.
These coefficients confirm the results of the baseline specification (Table 3 , Panel A-C, column 2).
Employment did not immediately respond to the US intervention, but, in all three samples, the number of employees rose within 5 years since the start of the program.
While the estimated difference is significantly increasing over time for firms that applied for management and the combined management and technology transfers, the effects after 10 and 15 years were statistically indistinguishable for technology transfer (Table 3 My estimates using the unbalanced panel (i.e., including firms that exited the market over time) are larger than my baseline estimates, consistent with the idea that firms in nonexperimental provinces that survived for 15 years after the program without participating in it had "better" performance than firms that failed. Restricting the sample to firms that survived for all the 15 years after the program may, if anything, downward bias the estimates.
My findings indicate that the management transfer had large and persistent effects on firm performance. Although to the best of my knowledge this is the first paper that provides a long-term analysis, the magnitude of the short-run results is comparable to other findings in the literature. 
Complementarity between Management and Technology
Did the simultaneous adoption of American management practices and the purchase of US technologically-advanced machines have complementary effects on firm performance? I find that the performance of firms which received the combined management and technology transfers increased significantly more than the sum of the performance of firms that received either the management or the technology transfer. This suggests a complementarity between management and technology.
The research design does not allow to compare the effects of the program across different transfers. Since firms chose the transfer they wanted to receive, it is likely that businesses that chose the management transfer were different from companies that chose the technol-24 The DID approach does not allow capturing the growth rate of firms that did not participate in the Productivity Program. 1950's and 1960's were decades of sustained economic growth for Italy, especially in manufacturing sector (Felice and Vecchi (2015) ). In Appendix 
where Transfer j i is an indicator for firms that applied for management transfer for j = 1, for technology transfer for j = 2, and for combined management and technology transfers for j = 3, and the other variables are as defined for equation 1. Each j(t+⌧ ) coefficient measures the impact of the Productivity Program ⌧ years after the US intervention on firms located in experimental provinces that applied for transfer j, compared with firms in nonexperimental provinces that applied for transfer j.
Management and technology were complementary. In each year after the Productivity Program, sales, employment, and productivity of firms that received both the management and the technology transfers were statistically significantly higher than the sum of those of firms that got only the management and only the technology transfer. After 15 years, the additional growth in sales was 7.1%, in employment 20.3%, and in TFPR 14.6% (Table 3 , Panel C; the F -statistics for of the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients on the combined management and technology transfers and the sum of coefficients on management and technology transfers are reported in Appendix Table   A .8).
25 The matching is done with one replacement. To limit the risk that this procedure yields "bad" matches, I impose a caliper of 0.25, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) . This means that all matches not equal to or within 0.25 standard deviations of each covariate are dropped. The balancing tests for the matched firms are presented in Appendix Table A. 10. 26 The identification assumption is that determinants of firm self-selection into a specific transfer do not change across firms in experimental and nonexperimental provinces. The effects of management and combined management and technology transfers were significantly larger for firms operating in industries with a larger productivity gap with the US (Appendix Table A .11), which suggests that these transfers helped less productive
Italian firms to catch up with the others. However, it is worth noting that the effects of the program were large and persistent over time also for firms in relatively more productive industries. By contrast, for the technology transfer alone, the results are largely driven by companies operating in industries that were ex-ante more productive. These firms significantly improved their performance even in the short-run, which suggests that firms lagging behind might not be fully able to take advantage of technologically-advanced machines.
Did Productivity Program effects differ by firm size? For firms that received the management and the combined management and technology transfers, larger firms (with between 50 and 99, or more than 100 employees) experienced a larger increase in sales, employment and TFPR one year after the US intervention (Appendix Table A .12, Panel A and C) . This finding may indicate that smaller firms face higher adjustment costs in introducing new management practices (Bloom et al. (2016) ). However, in the long run, these costs faded out and the impact of the program was relatively larger for companies with less than 50 employees. In contrast, the impact of technology transfer both in the short and in the long run was greater for larger firms. Those firms were more similar in size to US firms employing technologically-advanced machines before the program (Appendix Table A suggesting that the effects of the Productivity Program were not related to the economic conditions of the areas where they were located.
Mechanisms
The evidence presented in Section 5 showed that managerial training had a large and immediate effect on firm performance and that, the effect persisted up to at least 15 years after the Productivity Program. In contrast, the technology transfer had an impact that, however, did not persist over time. In this section, I examine the potential channels behind these findings.
Implementation of the Productivity Program Contents
What changed in the firms that participated in the US managerial training? I examine which contents of the Productivity Program were implemented by receiving firms, by combining quantitative evidence from firm balance sheets with qualitative evidence from technical reports compiled by US experts that visited the participating firms in the three years after the program.
73 percent of firms which received management transfer and 75 percent of firms which received combined management and technology transfers started reporting human resources training and marketing expenditures in their balance sheets within one year since the program (Appendix Table A .15 ). This percentage increases to 95 and 97, respectively, within 3 years. These practices were not dismissed with the end of the US monitoring:
almost the same percentage of firms were still reporting expenditures in these practices 15 years after the program. The US technical reports indicate that the human resource training included both training for leaders, implemented by 90 percent of participating firms, and training for the rest of the workers, started by more than 95 percent of participating firms, as well as bonuses for the most productive workers, introduced by more than 85 percent of the participating firms. Marketing involved the organization of advertising campaigns, implemented by almost all participating firms, and the creation of an independent marketing research group that worked on market research and branding.
The technical reports also indicate that 65 percent of the firms that received management and combined management and technology transfers started performing routine maintenance of the machines and 71 percent a general maintenance of firm safety conditions within one year. These percentages were, respectively, 87 percent and 92 percent after three years. As a result, interventions to repair machines dropped by 22.3 percent, and workers' reported injuries by 28.5 percent over the same period. Finally, almost all firms started tracking their production and managing sales and orders.
The relatively fast adoption of managerial techniques by most participating firms does not allow a separate evaluation of the impact of each practice, but is consistent with the large increase in sales and TFPR observed in the three years after the program. For instance, factory operations decreased machine downtime and workers' injuries, which is likely to have an immediate impact on firm productivity. Similarly, production planning could have reduced inventory, and therefore increased productivity by decreasing capital.
Finally, advertising campaigns could at least in part explain the large and rapid sales growth.
However, it is reasonable to think that the effects of other practices materialized over the years: for example, it may have taken some time to train all the workers and enable them to use new knowledge in the production process. Equivalently, market research and branding are likely to produce effects in the longer run. Moreover, these techniques, if regularly performed as inferred from the balance sheets, can have a cumulative effect over time (Womack et al. (1990) ), which can explain why firm performance continued to improve in the 15 years after the program.
Looking at the technology transfer, the technical reports indicate that 95 percent of the firms asked for technical assistance in setting up the new machines at least once and 65 percent at least twice. These implementation difficulties may explain the limited impact on firm performance in the first few years after the Productivity Program. Moreover, I do not find any evidence of managerial practices adoption, which confirms that the simple exposure to the US production methods did not affect firm "managerial capital" without proper training.
Firm Organization
Companies which participated in the Productivity Program also made changes to their organization in response to the Productivity Program and their improved performance.
In turn, such changes are likely to have amplified the initial effects of the program. To capture these effects, I estimate equation 1, using as dependent variables the firm's number of plants, the manager-to-worker ratio, and an indicator for professionally-managed firms (i.e., businesses with no representative of the family or kin formally involved in their governance).
Over time, firms that received management transfer and the combined management and technology transfers gradually increased the number of plants, with a cumulative rise of 16.9 and 19.4 percent, respectively, in 15 years. The rise in plants is determined by the increased firm size, measured by the number of employees, that also materialized over time (Table 5 , Panels A and C, column 1). More employees and plants require more managerial supervision. Receiving firms not only increased the number of managers (defined as executive with a college degree), but also the manager-to-worker ratio (Table   5 , Panels A and C, column 2). A higher manager-to-worker ratio may have ensured better workers' and plants' organization, with consequent productivity gains. Finally, firms that received managerial and the combined management and technology transfers were more likely to become professionally-managed businesses (Table 5 , Panels A and C, column 3). The shift from a family management to a professional management is likely to have affected firm capital structure, investment strategy, and overall business plan. As shown in Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , individual managers are central in making these decisions.
I do not find evidence of any changes in number of plants and manager-to-worker ratio, and probability of becoming a professionally-managed firm for firms that received the technology transfer (Table 5 , Panels B, columns 1-3). This result is consistent with the evidence presented in Doms et al. (1997) , which shows that the adoption of new technology is not associated with variation in firm workforce and organization.
Financing and Investment
I test if firms that participated in the Productivity Program, in light of their improved performance, had more access to financing from banks and undertook new investments.
To do so, I estimate equation 1, using as dependent variables outstanding loans from banks, investment and profitability, measured by firm return-on-asset (ROA).
In the short run firms that received management and the combined management and technology transfers did not increase bank loans and investment. However, in the longer run, as their performance continued to improve, these businesses increased the bank loans amount, their investments and ROA, compared to the firms excluded by the budget cut (Table 5 , Panels A and C, columns 4-5). It is worth noting that these changes happened, even though such companies did not receive any injection of capital from the program.
Firms that received technology transfer experienced a mechanical increase in both loans and investment, by 11.9 and 10.6 percent, respectively, one year after the US intervention, upon receiving the new US machines. However, in the long run there is no additional increase, compared to excluded firms (Table 5 , Panel B, columns 4-5). Moreover, the ROA remained almost unchanged, indicating that these companies did not become more profitable. This evidence is consistent with the idea that capital alone cannot generate firm growth, but that the "managerial capital" on how to use physical capital is needed (Bruhn et al. (2017) ). In fact, firms that got the technology transfer were not able to maintain their competitive advantage, once the lifecycle of the new machines -estimated around 10 years (Boel (2003) ) -ended. (2000); Grossman and Helpman (1991) ). If managers were in charge of making export decisions, the export channel may explain why the effects of management transfer persisted over time.
Exports
In 1951 only 14 percent of the firms that applied for the Productivity Program were exporters. I first examine whether US assistance increased the probability of exporting for non-exporters firms. I estimate a linear probability model via the equation
where Exports isprt is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i in industry s, located in province p in region r is exporting in year t; and the other variables are defined as in equation 1.
The Productivity Program increased the probability of exporting. Firms that received management and the combined management and technology transfers were, respectively, 2.4 and 3.3 percent more likely to be exporters one year after the US intervention and 29.0 and 31.5 percent after 15 years. Firms that received technology transfer were 1.3 percent more likely to be exporters one year after the US intervention and 5.1 percent after 15 years (Appendix Table A .17).
I investigate whether the export channel is driving the results by re-estimating equation 1 on the sample to firms that did not start exporting in any of the 15 years after the Productivity Program. My estimates reported are smaller in magnitude than those attained using the full sample, but follow the same pattern over time (Appendix Table   A .17, columns 2-4). Although exports are correlated with the improved firm performance, 21 they do not completely explain my findings.
Price Effects
The improved performance of firms receiving the US transfers may have enabled them to increase their market power. As a result, the increased sales and TFPR might be also due to the higher prices charged by the participating companies. I derive a firm-level markups estimation by using the method pioneered by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) . 28 This approach computes markup without relying on market-level demand information, but only requires standard firm-level data. The main assumptions are that at least one input is variable (therefore, not subject to adjustment costs) and that firms minimize costs. The intuition is as follows. Under cost minimization, the output elasticity of a variable factor of production is only equal to its expenditure share in total revenue when price equals marginal cost of production. Under any form of imperfect competition, however, the relevant markup drives a wedge between the input's revenue share and its output elasticity. Therefore, the markup is calculated via
, where µ it is the markup of firm i at time t; Q it is firm output; X it is the variable input; p X it X is the expenditure on input X; and p Q it Q is total revenue. I estimate the output elasticity from the production function, estimated using Table A .19 ). This suggests that, in the short run, the Productivity Program had a small impact on firm market power. Between 5 and 15 years after the US intervention, the estimates that control for markup are smaller than estimates from equation 1. The pattern over time, however, is fully consistent. Therefore, the change in market power of firms that received the Productivity Program is correlated with its long-run effects, but cannot entirely explain its pattern over time, suggesting that there were in fact productivity improvements.
The Indirect Effects of the Productivity Program
This section investigates whether the Productivity Program had indirect effects on firms that did not participate in it either because they did not apply or because they were excluded by the US budget cut.
Why Didn't All Firms Apply for the Productivity Program?
Forty percent of firms eligible to participate in the Productivity Program did not apply, although participation was financed entirely by the US. Moreover, among applicants, firms chose different US transfers. I examine the relationship between firm characteristics and self-selection into the Productivity Program by estimating the following multinomial logit model Log P r(Apply i = j) P r(No Apply)
where the choice is to apply for a management transfer, to apply for a technology transfer, to apply for the combined management and technology transfers or not to apply (my baseline); ExpProv p is an indicator for firms located in experimental provinces, r is pilot region fixed effects, and ⇣ s is manufacturing industries fixed effects. X i is a vector of firm characteristics in 1951.
Larger firms, with higher sales and TFPR were more likely to apply for the Productivity
Program, compared to firms that did not apply (Appendix Table A .14) . For instance, a one-percent higher number of employees increased the probability of applying for a management transfer by 0.8 percent, the probability of applying for a technology transfer by 1.7 percent and the probability of applying for the combined management and technology transfers by 2.8 percent. Firms that were family-managed were between 15.1 and 17.6 less likely to apply.
My evidence suggests that "better" firms were more likely to apply for the program. 
Firms that Did Not Apply for the Productivity Program
If firms in experimental provinces had performed better than firms in nonexperimental provinces even in absence of the Productivity Program, also firms that did not apply from such provinces should have performed better than firms that did not apply from nonexperimental provinces. Therefore, comparing eligible firms in experimental and nonexperimental provinces that did not apply for any US interventions could be interpreted as a placebo test, under the assumption that the Productivity Program produced effects only on firms that participated in it.
I repeat the main analysis of the paper using as sample firms that did not apply for the However, if the Productivity Program determined spillover effects, not finding differences in performance between such firms could also be due to a combination of positive and negative spillovers. Possible spillover effects are discussed in the next session.
Spillover Effects
The Productivity Program improved the performance of firms that received US transfers.
However, it might also have affected firms that did not participate in the program. For instance, firms that did not receive US transfers might have imitated receiving firms and started implementing modern management practices or buying new technologicallyadvanced machines. Participant firms might also have stolen business from non-receiving firms, generating negative spillovers. In this setting, a complete spillover analysis is not possible since I only observe firms that were eligible for participating in the Productivity
Program. Nevertheless, I can offer some suggestive evidence on the indirect effects of the Productivity Program on non-receiving firms.
Specifically, I assume that a non-receiving firm located close to participating firms operating in the same manufacturing industry is likely to be exposed to negative spillovers through competition in input and output market. A non-receiving firm located close to participating firms operating in different manufacturing industries is relatively more likely to be exposed to positive spillovers: the absence of competition, at least in the output market, may have encouraged receiving firms to share their new knowledge.
I estimate the following equation using as sample all the firms in experimental provinces and in nonexperimental provinces that did not receive the US assistance (either because they did not apply or because they were excluded after the budget cut):
where ↵ is a constant term; ExpProv p is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is located in an experimental province; Applied i is a dummy for firms that applied for the Productivity Program (but did not get it); Different Industry j i is the count of firms that received US transfer j (where j = 1 for management transfer; j = 2 for technology transfer; j = 3 for the combined management and technology transfers), operating in a different industry and located in the radius of x km from firm i, where x is 5, 10 or 20 km; Same Industry i is the count of firms that received US transfer j, operating in the same industry and located in the radius of x km from firm i, where x is 5, 10 or 20 km; Post t is an indicator variable that equals one for the years after these firms received the US transfer. The dependent variables are a shut-down indicator, sales, employees, and TFPR. The coefficient µ j captures the effect of an additional firm within x km and in a different industry that received the US transfer j on the outcome of non-receiving firms.
The coefficients ⌫ j captures the effect of an additional firm within x km and in the same industry that received the US transfer j on the outcome of a non-receiving firm.
Having an additional firm within 5, 10 or 20 km that received any US transfer but oper-25 ated in a different industry has no effect on the probability of survival, sales, employment and TFPR of a non-receiving firm (Appendix Table A .16 ). This result suggests that imitation effects by non-receiving firms were almost zero. The estimates also indicate that having an additional participating firm within a radius of 10 km and operating in the same industry has a negative, but small, effect on sales and TFPR. A possible explanation for the limited negative spillovers, although non-testable, could be that receiving firms started competing at national or European level, and therefore they had limited effects on the local market. Table 1 ). The increase of sales caused by the Productivity Program within one year is estimated to be 7.3 percent (Table 3 , Panel A, column 1). Therefore, for non-participating firms it would have been profitable to pay this amount out of pocket and receive management training. However, the US did not allow those firms to enroll in the program, even if they had paid the participation costs. Nevertheless, such enterprises could have started implementing modern management practices by imitating the receiving firms. Lack of information however might have prevented them from doing so. First, excluded firms might have not been aware of the adoption of such practices by receiving firms. 33 Second, it could have been the case that non-receiving firms thought these practices were not profitable, attributing the success of receiving firms to other factors, for example, networking effects. Or, even if they were aware of the importance of such 32 The cost of participating to the US study trips for a firm is given by the sum of the administrative costs of visas, lodging and travels of each trainee, the wages earned by such trainees while working in the US plants, and the cost of the monitoring the firms in the follow-up period. I estimate such costs by using the data I collected from the Productivity Program accounting, stored at the Italian Central Archives of the State (ACS), accessed in January 2014. It is harder to estimate the opportunity cost of sending the managers in the US. However, given the average age of trainees was 35 years, it is reasonable to think that more senior people were able to run the firms during this period of leave. Moreover, the US experts started monitoring such companies, contributing to limit the impact of this opportunity cost. 33 Information seems to play an important role in today's development context as well. For instance, Bloom et al. (2013) finds that one reason why large Indian textile firms do not adopt managerial practices is that they are not aware of their existence.
practices, they might not have known how to implement them without US experts' training. Moreover, receiving firms had no incentive to discuss the details of their business with potential competitors. Finally, labor mobility in Italy during the 1950s and 1960s
was extremely low (Saibante (1960) ). For instance, 88% of managers who visited the US were still working in the same firms 15 years after US intervention. Although data on the mobility of the rest of the workers are not available, it is reasonable to think that firm-to-firm worker movements were very limited, with consequent modest knowledge spillovers, as described in Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) .
Excluded firms also could have purchased US machines in the private market, without benefiting from the lower interest rates. In this case, credit constraints might have been
relevant. An ex-post calculation of the profitability of such an investment indicates that the average cost of buying the US machines was $235,782, 34 equivalent to 23.2 percent of firm annual sales before the start of the program ($945,780, Table 1 ). The estimated increase in sales due to the new machines over 15 years (10.4 percent, Table 3 , Panel B, column 1) was therefore not enough to repay the investment.
8 Robustness Checks
Selection of Experimental Provinces
A possible threat to the identification strategy of this paper is that the selection of firms participating in the program was not random. If firms which eventually received the Productivity Program had been randomly selected, I simply could have compared receiving and non-receiving applicant firms in the post-Productivity Program period.
The estimates obtained excluding the pre-program period are essentially the same as the difference-in-differences coefficients, confirming that the province selection after the budget cut was plausibly exogenous (Appendix Table A .21). Table A .22.).
Attrition

Robustness to Reporting Effects
Sales, employment and TFPR come from firm balance sheets. Given the self-reported nature of the balance sheets data, possible concerns are both misreporting and changes in reporting behavior caused by the Productivity Program. These effects are unlikely to be a major factor in this research, for a number of reasons. First, from technical reports compiled by the US experts visiting Italian plants, it seems that firm performance improved due to changes in management practices and production technology rather than accounting methods. Second, survivorship and employment that are not subject to reporting errors follow the same dynamics as sales and TFPR. Third, the Productivity
Program did not organize specific sessions for reporting and accounting, and I do not observe changes in the balance sheet structure of receiving firms after the program.
Another concern is the Hawthorne effects. Simply being part of the Productivity Program may have improved firm performance. For instance, study trips participants or employees could have been more motivated or have worked harder during this time period. Although the data do not allow me to rule out this possibility, Hawthorne-type effects should dissipate in the long run and therefore could not explain why the impact of the Productivity Program persisted over time.
Conclusions and Discussion
I estimate the long-run effects of the adoption of management practices and new technologies on firm performance, using evidence from the Marshall Plan Productivity Program. This is, to the best of my knowledge, one of the first studies that uses non-experimental data to examine the extent to which managerial practices and technologically-advanced machines affect business outcomes. This paper also contributes to the long-standing de- (Saibante (1960) ) might have prevented knowledge diffusion through workers' turnover (Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) ).
What are the implications of this research for public policy? Italy in the 1950s was comparable to some developing countries today, where business training and technology transfers are among the most common forms of active support for small and medium firms ). However, evaluations of such policies are usually made over a limited number of months or years and on relatively small samples. In contrast,
the Productivity Program provides evidence on a large and heterogenous number of firms both in the short and in the long run. Another advantage of this research is that I observe all firms, including eligible non-applicant, whereas in most settings only applicant firms are observed. Firms that did not apply for the Productivity Program were, on average, smaller and less productive than firms that applied for it, suggesting that firms with more need for business training and technology transfers might not want to participate in such programs.
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Figures and Tables n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.33 n/a 2.45 n/a Engineers in US n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3.19 3.37 n/a Loans (k USD) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 223.49 250.77 n/a Observations 6,065 n/a n/a n/a 809 1,190 1,625 2,441
Notes. Summary statistics for the 6,065 firms eligible to apply for the Productivity Program in 1951. Data are provided at firm level. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 present, respectively, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of characteristics and outcomes of all the 6,065 eligible firms. Columns 5, 6, 7, and 8 report the mean of the same variables, separately, for 809 firms that applied for management transfer, 1,190 firms that applied for technology transfer, 1,625 firms that applied for the combined management and technology transfers, and 2,441 firms that did not apply. Plants (log TFPR) is the logarithm of total factor productivity revenue, estimated using the Ackerberg et al. (2006) method; Export, Family-managed, Submit application, Management, Technology, the combined management and technology transfers are indicators that equal one if, respectively, firm exported, was family-managed (as defined on p. 11), applied for the Productivity Program, chose management transfer, chose technology transfer, chose the combined management and technology transfers; Managers in US, Engineers in US and Loans (k USD) report, respectively, the number of managers or engineers for which a visit in US firms was asked and the amount of loans requested. Notes. Balancing tests for 804 firms that applied for management transfer (columns 1-3), 1,178 firms that applied for technology transfer (columns 4-6), and 1,612 firms that applied for the combined management and technology transfers (columns 7-9). 30 firms whose applications were rejected are excluded. Data are provided at firm level. Columns 1-2, 4-5, and 7-8 present mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of characteristics and outcomes for firms in experimental and nonexperimental provinces, separately for management, technology transfer and the combined management and technology transfers. Columns 3, 6, and 9 report the coefficients estimated from regressing each variable on a dummy for being located in an exeperimental province and a full set of pilot regions fixed effects. Lombardia is the excluded pilot region. Standard errors are estimated by aggregating the data into two periods: pre-and post-intervention (as in Bertrand et al. (2004) Notes. Columns 1-3, 5-7, and 9-11 report the coefficients estimated from equation 1 for firms that applied for management transfer (Panel A), firms that applied for technology transfer (Panel B) and firms that applied for the combined management and technology transfers (Panel C). Columns 4, 8, and 12 report coefficients estimated from equation 2. In columns 1-2, 5-6, and 9-11 the samples include only that survived in the 15 years after the Productivity Program; in columns 3, 7, and 11 all applicant firms are included; in columns 4, 8 and 12 the samples include only matched firms. Data are provided at firm level. The dependent variables are logged deflated sales, converted from 1951 Italian lira to 2010 euro and exchanged at 0.780 euro=USD 1 (columns 1-4); logged employement, reporting the number of employees per firm (columns 5-8); and logged TFPR, estimated using the Ackerberg et al. (2006) method (columns 9-12). Standard errors are estimated by aggregating the data into two periods: pre-and post-intervention (as in Bertrand et al. (2004) ) in columns 1-3, 5-7 and 9-11, and bootstrapped with 250 replications in columns 4, 8 and 12. *** denotes 1%, ** denotes 5%, and * denotes 10% significance. Notes. Columns 1-2 and 4-6 report the coefficients estimated from equation 1 for 538 firms that applied for management transfer (Panel A), 748 firms that applied for technology transfer (Panel B) and 1,082 firms that applied for the combined management and technology transfers (Panel C) and survived for 15 years after the Productivity Program. Column 3 reports the coefficients estimated from the linear probability model (LPM) of equations 1 for the same samples of firms. The dependent variables are logged Plants, reporting the number of plants per firm; logged manager-to-worker Ratio, indicating the ratio of firm managers over total workers; Governance, indicator variable equal to one for firms that were professionally-managers; logged Loans, reporting firm outstanding loans; logged Investment, reporting firm investment values; and logged ROA, firm return to assets, measured as the ratio between profit and capital. Standard errors are estimated by aggregating the data into two periods: pre-and post-intervention (as in Bertrand et al. (2004) ). *** denotes 1%, ** denotes 5%, and * denotes 10% significance.
